COVID-19: an African overview
African countries have reacted in different ways to the pandemic, from outright denial to some of the most stringent lockdown rules in the world
When retired star footballer Musa Otieno went public on 30 June 2020 after contracting COVID-19, Kenyans sat up and listened. It was a sobering moment for the country, especially among the naysayers who still believed that the disease was nothing but a scaremongering tactic by the government. Otieno was a long-serving captain of the national team apart from playing professional football for the Cape Town based Santos FC, which won the South African League when he was there in the 2001/02 season. Before news of Otieno’s illness had sunk in, the country was numbed by the death from COVID-19 of popular TV and stage actor Charles Bukeko, who gained world fame when he appeared in an advert for Coca Cola, which aired globally just before the 2010 World Cup.
Finally, celebrated TV news anchor Jeff Koinange also went public on 20 July 2020 after testing positive. The former CNN journalist advised Kenyans to take the disease seriously. These three cases proved to be a godsend for a government that was trying hard to contain the spread of the virus amidst widespread public scepticism. Ever since the first case was reported in Kenya in early March, the numbers have kept rising, a situation that prompted President Uhuru Kenyatta to announce a nationwide curfew as well as lockdown of the capital Nairobi, the port city of Mombasa and Mandera, bordering Somalia and Ethiopia.
The first of the raft of measures were announced by President Kenyatta on 26 March 2020 with a 7 pm to 5 am curfew exempting those providing essential services, and a ban on all gatherings, including places of worship and sporting activities. Weddings and funerals were allowed but with the caveat that only 15 people attend while adhering to all the safety protocols laid out by the Ministry of Health. President Kenyatta, at the time of writing, has been reviewing these measures monthly and in his latest address on 28 August 2020, he extended the curfew and ban on bars and entertainment operations for a further 30 days.
Churches and mosques have since been allowed to open but with a strict one and a half hours service with attendants limited to 100 people maximum. The first partial lifting of the tough conditions that allowed the sale of alcohol in restaurants, but with the caveat that alcohol could only be sold if patrons also ordered food, was announced by the head of state in his June address. But nothing can separate Kenyans from their drink, it seems, and soon afterwards Health Minister Mutahi Kagwe lamented that people were breaking the rule with impunity. According to the former newspaper executive, wily Kenyans were going to restaurants, ordering a sausage or two, then engaging in binge drinking.
Restaurant goers referred to this as “Mutahi Kagwe Special”, (“special” here being borrowed from eateries parlance where people order special meals), the minister said. And the beer ban busting was not entirely limited to the common folk. Towards the end of July, the Senator for Nairobi Johnson Sakaja, a close ally of President Kenyatta, was caught by policemen as he hosted a party at a high-end hotel long after the permitted hours of 5 to 7 pm. His case was all the more interesting because he was the chairman of the Senate ad hoc committee on COVID-19. A contrite Sakaja addressed a press conference the next day where he not only apologised but resigned from his committee position.
He was fined Kshs 15,000 (about $150) by a Nairobi court, a punishment Kenyans dismissed as a slap on the wrist, considering that senators earn as much as Kshs 1 million per month. Like many countries in the world, Kenya is struggling to combat the disease that has all but brought the country to a standstill. In late July, the Ministry of Health ordered 100,000 body bags to dispose of the corpses of coronavirus victims, while most of the county governments have announced they are purchasing land to be used as public cemeteries to bury the COVID-19 dead. But by the end of August, there was not a single county that had started burials at the newly acquired cemeteries.
Meanwhile, schools remain closed, with the government saying some of the institutions will be turned into temporary hospitals if the situation deteriorates. As at July 28, Kenya had recorded 33,016 cases, 564 deaths and 19,296 recoveries. It was against this background that President Kenyatta in his address to the nation on July 3 asked for more caution from the public in fighting the pandemic. The head of state admitted that he was walking a tight rope, trying to balance containing the scourge while ensuring that the economy did not go into meltdown. Kenyatta’s dilemma mirrors that of his fellow African heads of state as they try to deal with a new enemy that respects no borders.
The continent’s leaders have had mixed reactions to the virus. Whereas President Kenyatta and his South African counterpart have opted to ban, ease, then re-ban the sale and consumption of alcohol, on the extreme side are the former Burundi head of state, Pierre Nkurunzisa, who famously declared that God himself had assured him that COVID-19 would not harm Burundians. Then he got ill and died on 8 June 2020. Although the government announced he had died from a heart attack, local news outlets claimed that he had succumbed to COVID-19. As Nkurunzisa lay dying in a rural hospital in his country, his wife, First Lady Denise Bucuma Nkurunzisa, was airlifted to Nairobi where she was treated and discharged in time for her husband’s burial.
Reports indicated that she was being treated for COVID-19, although the hospital, citing patient confidentiality, never responded to the media reports. Diplomatic sources were also quoted in sections of the Kenyan press, saying that President Kenyatta was under pressure to allow some top South Sudanese generals to get treated in Nairobi after they tested positive for COVID-19. South Sudan Vice President Riek Machar wrote to Kenya on 7 April, 2020 seeking to have a high-level person be allowed treatment in Kenya. However, the request appears to have been turned down.
In Tanzania, President John Magufuli has flatly rejected any suggestions that his country could be in danger, and suggested Tanzanians go about their lives as usual, with no masks, no tests and no infection or deaths reported. Magufuli, who holds a doctorate degree in chemistry, has run into diplomatic turbulence with Kenya over his standpoint. In his national address on 27 July 2020, and without directly naming Magufuli, President Kenyatta spoke of “others” who were stifling information about the virus. A day after Kenyatta’s address, a plane carrying a Kenyan delegation to the burial of former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa was turned back to Nairobi immediately after entering Tanzanian airspace.
Authorities on both sides blamed mechanical problems with the aircraft and bad weather, although the plane later landed safely in Nairobi and other planes landed in Tanzania on that day. In a tweet that was retweeted many times, the digital editor at The Star newspaper, Oliver Mathenge, said, “President Magufuli appears to have hit back after his Kenyan counterpart, Uhuru Kenyatta, insinuated that Tanzania was not honest about its COVID-19 situation. A Kenyan delegation to attend the burial of former Tanzania President Mkapa was not allowed to land today.” In Madagascar, tensions were reported after health minister Ahmad Ahmad wrote to the international community on 22 July 2020 to help the country deal with COVID-19.
This was in stark contrast to the position taken by President Andry Rajoelina, who has been vocal in his promotion of a herbal concoction which he has stated can prevent and cure the disease. The two divergent positions by the president and his health minister led to squabbles that came to a head on 20 August 2020, when the head of state fired the minister in a cabinet reshuffle. Initially, African countries were sitting pretty, smug in the false belief that COVID-19 was generally affecting people of Caucasian origin. As European countries like Spain and Italy reported infections and deaths in large numbers, African borders remained relatively safe. The trend was bucked when the disease reached the United States with reports that the black population there was the hardest hit.
Nonetheless, and probably by some divine providence, the wiping out of Africans as earlier predicted has not happened. With run-down health systems and other infrastructure, most experts were agreed that Africa would be hardest hit. However, with 1,196,298 cases, 28,021 deaths and 16,385,382 recoveries at the time of writing in the last week of August, Africa is not that badly off . But there is no time for African leaders and its health experts to rest on their laurels. One silver lining for Africa is that unlike other diseases where the ruling elite and their henchmen seek medical treatment abroad, with COVID-19 there is no such luxury, and it behoves the leaders to upgrade health facilities in their respective countries.
Carbon emissions: room to grow
There’s big potential for Africa to participate in international carbon markets given its ability to contribute to greenhouse gas mitigation
Carbon emissions trading is a market-based mechanism for trading pollution credits among countries. It includes a range of policy instruments aimed at assisting industrialised countries to achieve
their emissions targets by allowing reductions to take place where they cost the least.
The trade works in several ways: International Emissions Trading (IET), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and Joint Implementation (JI). The IET system involves a scheme called “cap and trade” in which governments or intergovernmental bodies such as the European Commission (EC) hand out licences to pollute (or “carbon permits”) to major polluting industries within their boundaries.
Industries can then trade these permits with one another to meet their emissions reduction targets.
Cap-and-trade schemes are the most popular way to regulate carbon dioxide (CO2) and other emissions. The scheme’s governing body begins by setting a cap on allowable emissions. It then distributes or auctions off emissions allowances that total the cap. Member companies that do not have enough allowances to cover their emissions must either make reductions or buy another company’s spare credits. Members with extra allowances can sell them or bank them for future use. Cap- and-trade schemes can be either mandatory or voluntary.
Africa accounts for only 2% of the trading in the global carbon market. Of that 2%, South Africa and North Africa enjoy the largest portion of the projects under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the main carbon market resulting from the Kyoto Protocol, with the rest of Africa contributing a paltry 0.6%. According to Oscar Reyes, a researcher with Carbon Trade Watch, these ﬁgures render Africa marginal to the carbon market, and the trade has been irrelevant to the continent’s efforts to tackle climate change. According to the World Bank, China has dominated the CDM market since its inception, accounting for about 66% of all contracted CDM supply between 2002 and 2008, and 72% of the market in 2009.
India and Brazil rank second and third on the list of sellers in terms of volumes transacted. One reason why the African carbon market is less attractive relates to how electricity is generated. Access to electricity is a major challenge across much of Africa, with less than 25% – and, in some countries, as little as 5% – of the population enjoying access to grid electricity. Thus, the World Bank has calculated that the 47 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, with a combined population of 800 million people, generate as much power as Spain, with a population of 45 million.
The lack of carbon-reduction investment opportunities in the power sector and the limited number of carbon-intensive industries outside northern Africa and South Africa implies that the rest of the continent is not well positioned to influence the direction of the debate around carbon trading. The types of projects that could deliver livelihood beneﬁts to Africans, such as renewable and other small- scale energy projects, are not “cheap” options of carbon abatement, and are therefore less likely to attract the big investors. Given the limited opportunities for expanding the carbon market in Africa through the CDM, attention has shifted to projects that can be delivered through the voluntary market.
These include improved stove and tree planting projects, which have been controversial for a variety of reasons, including the difficulties involved in verifying the offsets. According to ecologist Thomas Crowther and colleagues at ETH Zurich, a Swiss university, a tree can remove seven tons of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere during its life. If so, some ﬁve billion trees would need to be planted per year to counter current emission levels globally. Moreover, planting trees to soak up carbon can have detrimental knock on effects. As Robert Jackson argued in a December 2005 presentation at Duke University in North Carolina, growing plantations of fast-growing trees uses a lot of water.
This can reduce “the water available for drinking and irrigation, and harm local aquatic ecosystems”, according to the journal Nature (December 2005). Moreover, “forest soils are saltier and more acidic, compared with other types of plant cover such as crops or grasslands”, Jackson and his colleagues found. Developing countries, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), remain marginalised in global carbon markets despite signiﬁcant mitigation opportunities in agriculture and forestry. However, Africa has signiﬁcant potential for renewable energy, a key driver of the carbon emissions reduction.
Yet Africa’s share of the carbon markets remains low, as already mentioned. It is puzzling, therefore, that the proponents of carbon trading continue to tout the beneﬁts it offers to the poor in Africa,
in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary. For instance, a project in the Bukaleba Forestry Reserve in Uganda, intended to offset the greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) of a coal-ﬁred power plant to be built in Norway, clearly illustrates the conflict of interests of the offset company, host countries, and the needs of local communities.
The Ugandan government received a meagre once-off fee of $410 and an annual rent of about $4,10 for each hectare of plantation – an absurdly low lease price, given the huge carbon credits the Norwegian company (Tree Farms) was aiming to sell. The project was also responsible for evicting 8,000 people living on the land from 13 villages, depriving them of their livelihoods, and probably driving them to clear land elsewhere. Africa’s share of voluntary carbon markets is also still small, then, as compared to the rest of the world. It’s a huge shortfall considering the potential beneﬁts of carbon offset revenue for sustainable development on the continent.
However, many African countries, including Kenya, Ghana, Mozambique, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo have seen a surge in international demand for offset projects in the voluntary carbon markets such as delivering clean cook stoves and water puriﬁcation devices, which are likely to increase participation in these markets (Bloomberg Energy, 2013). There are several reasons why Africa has failed in the carbon markets. Some scholars have blamed this on uncoordinated marketing efforts, as well as regulatory and policy challenges. They argue that the implementation thereof and global connections can make it a challenge for carbon trading to work.
There have also been circumstances under which baseline-and-credit CDM schemes have resulted in the maltreatment of indigenous peoples and their environment. Other scholars argue that cases of trade fraud and accounting discrepancies have hindered the development of these markets in Africa, with constraints ranging from the structure of the carbon markets themselves to the continent’s own unique situation; the perennial challenges of doing business in Africa have also affected its access to international carbon markets.
Yacob Mulugeta from the University of Surrey’s Centre of Environment and Sustainability says adequate legal and institutional frameworks are lacking, or are weak, and barriers to trade and investment, which may inhibit access to new technologies, and the high investment risks in some African countries, have also resulted in potentially lower prices for CERs. Another barrier to trade, he says, is the overall policy framework in potential host countries, which may include policies not conducive to CDM, for example high levels of taxation, high interest rates, a lack of support for foreign direct investment and uncertainties around ﬁscal policies.
Financing has also been cited as a major barrier to renewable energy and energy efficiency (RE/EE) projects, which deliver carbon emission reductions and sustainable development beneﬁts to low-developed countries in Africa. But Africa’s potential to participate in international carbon markets is large, given its ability to contribute to greenhouse gases mitigation. Its potential for renewable energy generation, climate smart agriculture and extensive forestry sector all provide huge GHG mitigation potential. There are also vast areas of low productivity land where management could be altered to increase carbon stocks and create credits.
Overcoming the challenges that hinder their exploitation could see Africa increase its ability to tap into the international carbon markets. If Africa is to beneﬁt in the carbon market, it will need to start leveraging other sources of ﬁnance, increasing its investments in renewable energy, catalysing the continent’s carbon markets by putting in place regulatory systems, and increasing public funding for seed capital for carbon reduction projects. Africa will need to develop and implement its own climate and carbon ﬁnance strategy, built on the recognition that the continent can contribute most effectively to mitigating climate change by promoting sustainable land-use practices.