Lessons from Trump’s dethronement for Africa

PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA – NOVEMBER 05: A man participating in a protest in support of counting all votes watches U.S. President Donald Trump hold a news conference as the election in the state is still unresolved on November 5, 2020 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. With no winner yet declared in the presidential election, all eyes are on the outcome of a few remaining swing states. Chris McGrath/Getty Images/AFP

In a historic US election, President Donald Trump was ousted from office by Joe Biden. Biden won 50.8% of the popular vote, while Trump still managed 47.5% in the largest voter turnout since 1908. The presidency of Donald Trump is widely viewed as anomalous, a monstrous blip in an otherwise healthy and deeply consolidated democracy. This would be a mistake. A deeper analysis reveals that populism can take root even in societies with relatively broad-based access to political and economic opportunities.

Globalisation, accelerating apace since the end of the Cold War in 1989, has resulted in a highly uneven distribution of the gains from trade and volatility from easy flight of capital. While global GDP has ballooned, inequalities have widened, with real income growth among the top quintile rapidly outpacing middle class wage growth. Local displacement has intensified. Outsourcing or automating jobs in the name of economic efficiency has created political ruptures in historically strong democracies. These dynamics have ploughed the soil for populism to take root. The populist playbook is to exploit the fears and disappointments of the economically marginalised and subvert democratic institutions in the process.

Trump’s tantrums over alleged vote-rigging and repeated court threats are simply part of the script. The phenomenon of democratic backsliding has so arrested the attention of scholars that between 2011 and 2018 alone, 1,700 academic articles were published on the subject. In the 40 years prior, a total of 1,500 articles covering threats to democracy appeared. The fact that Biden has won out against Trump may provide some reprieve for friends of democracy across the globe, but complacency is unwarranted. Otherwise strong democratic equilibria tend to be disrupted by socio-economic inequality, financial shocks, the exploitation of extreme political views by technological interference (read Cambridge Analytica) and the resultant perpetuation of echo-chamber social-media politics.

None of these trends show any sign of abating. Worryingly, they are also mutually reinforcing, which can create path-dependent trajectories away from democracy. As scholar Daron Acemoglu has pointed out, the global factors that have contributed to growing domestic inequality in the US have not been addressed, and policymakers are far from a consensus on how this can be done. Biden’s work is cut out for him to forge bi-partisan agreement that, for instance, higher federal minimum wages and a more redistributive tax system may be desirable. Even with that in place, though, the global trend towards distrusting scientific facts and resenting elites is strengthening. Populism thrives in such contexts.

Perhaps the most concerning element of Trump’s ascendancy was the willingness of Abraham Lincoln’s 150-year-old party to acquiesce to Trump’s proposition to ride on a Republican ticket. And, typical of populist incoherence, most of what he stood for and campaigned on were diametrically opposed to orthodox republican positions such as free trade. Nonetheless, as one commentator put it, Biden has ‘sleep-walked’ into the White House and the embers of democracy are still alive in the US. Notwithstanding the warning to avoid complacency, it remains good news because, on average, democracy causes economic growth. Why? Because its ability to remove leaders like Trump is one of its enduring attractions.

Consolidated democracy, for all its inefficiencies, respects the rule of law, insists on the separation of powers, punishes corruption, and gives the citizenry a voice that produces proper accountability from the elite. This institutional strength, in turn, results in economic dynamism, as contracts are honoured and businesses can flourish. Responsible players are crowded in while irresponsible players are either crowded out or deterred from engaging in corrupt activities. In a nutshell, good governance is more likely to take root in the context of robust political competition where the opposition has a fair and credible chance of winning elections.

While the world breathes a momentary sigh of relief, African countries continue to fight for democracy to take root at all, never mind worrying about whether it will consolidate. While the evidence suggests that democratisation across the continent is advancing, on average, a number of important red flags punctuate the trend. Tanzania, soon to be among the most populous countries on the continent, held its general elections on 28 October 2020. Incumbent President John Magufuli successfully rigged the process to secure for himself an incredible 84% of the vote while the main opposition managed to eke out 13%. According to the Polity V dataset, the country’s democratic score improved from 2 (out of a possible 10) to 4 from 2014 to 2015 (the year in which Magufuli came to power).

We expect that figure to move below zero once the next set of figures is released. Not only did Magufuli rig the elections, he has ruled with an iron fist of fear, initially rooting out some petty corruption – his populist ticket – but he has since crushed civil liberties and shut down opportunities for opposition parties to engage in politics. Post-election, Tundu Lissu, chief opposition leader who survived an assassination attempt in 2017, has had to flee the country after calling for protests against the election results; this in the midst of reports that at least 150 opposition leaders and members have been arrested since 27 October, with at least 18 remaining in custody. The frequency of abductions and/or forced disappearances has ticked up significantly since Magufuli came to power.


Economic growth has been sclerotic under Magufuli’s rule as he continues to be suspicious of the private sector and insists on white elephant megaprojects such as the Stiegler’s Gorge hydropower project that the country cannot afford. GDP per capita growth initially fell to 3% in 2015 (from 3.6% the year before) before recovering to 3.7% the following year. It has since fallen to 2.7%.

Magufuli came to the presidency from a weak base within the CCM – the liberation movement of Julius Nyerere – and is working hard to purge elites from within his ruling coalition who would otherwise ensure some degree of power-sharing. There is every reason to expect that Magufuli will attempt to clinch a third term in office, which would violate the constitution. He would join a long list of those who long ago eschewed term limits, a fundamental governance limit on executive power. A fundamental problem is not only that autocratic rule tends to result in misery and squalor for the majority, but that governance-dismantling autocrats seem to spur each other on across borders.

Zambia’s elections are set for 2021, and President Edgar Lungu appears to be taking a leaf out of the Magufuli playbook but with some variety to spice up the mix, drawing on Emmerson Mnangagwa’s Zimbabwean script too. It appears that his strategy for rigging the elections is to amend the constitution to allow coalition formation (instead of a runoff second ballot between the top two candidates) in the case of no candidate winning more than 50% of the vote. He brought this infamous “Bill 10” to parliament at the end of October but it failed (though by a margin of only 6 votes). At least this strategy indicates that Lungu is scared of losing the popular vote and does not have Magufuli-like power to simply rig the election to an arbitrary winning proportion of his pre-selected choice.

The opposition has a strong likelihood of winning the election, though Hakainde Hichilema – the leader of the opposition – is undoubtedly keen to avoid more jail time at the hands of Lungu’s trumped-up charges (as has happened before). Analysts expect that Lungu, on failing to win Bill 10, will now simply abolish the current voters’ register and create a new one more favourable to his prospects. The graph below indicates a surge of violence around the 2016 elections that saw Lungu gain a second term in office. As Natasha Chilundika has written over at Democracy in Africa, we really need to avoid a repetition of this come 2021.


Slightly further afield in Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni has been in power since 1986. Still going strong, according to scholar Moses Khisa, Museveni has “run roughshod over important constitutional and institutional safeguards, checks and balances that were enshrined in what was a relatively progressive and liberal [1995] constitution”. Museveni is edging in on the 38-year rule exercised by Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola, and the 37-year reign by Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe (both upended by their own ruling coalitions in 2017). Museveni’s assault on democracy began in 2003 with an eradication of constitutional term limits.

In addition to subverting apparently democratic institutions to advance authoritarian ends (by co-opting and corrupting the judiciary, for instance), he has also used external security threats as a cover under which to criminalise otherwise legitimate political activities. Museveni has had Kizza Besigye, his main opposition, arrested more than 1,000 times. A period of relative calm prevailed between 2007 and 2013, but violence against citizens has been on the rise, with incidents this year alone matching the 2006 data. The prospect of commercial oil revenues will further embolden Museveni’s autocratic stranglehold through enabling him to distribute patronage to a carefully selected circle of insiders and repress outsiders.


On the subject of Mugabe and dos Santos, their removal tells an important story. Autocrats who successfully consolidate power are almost always only removed by an internal coup or death in office. Very few in contemporary history have been upended by democratic forces. The risk of further autocratic consolidation is, therefore, immediately at hand. In Russia, Joseph Stalin’s death did not suddenly usher in democratic rule. Vladimir Putin’s stranglehold over the ruling coalition in Russia today is evidence enough to show that new autocrats are likely to gain ascendancy and the fight for democracy to take root requires far more than the removal of one autocrat. It requires the slow, hard work of establishing governance institutions that respect the rule of the people by the people.

In both Zimbabwe and Angola, new autocrats have arisen. Mnangagwa and Lourenco respectively came to power through removing their long-standing leaders who had placed family members ahead of party loyalists, threatening their access to power and rents. One may have expected that some kind of power-sharing mechanism would be re-established in both Zanu-PF and the MPLA respectively, but there is little cause for optimism on the basis of the current evidence. Both incumbents enjoy vast access to resource wealth, again enabling the distribution of rents to a select circle of loyalists and careful elimination of internal and external threats to their rule.

Citizen attempts to protest against grand corruption in Zimbabwe around July this year resulted in a rapid rise in disappearances, abductions, torture and arrests – these have not yet been captured in the data below, but the graph still paints a terrifying picture of the militarised regime’s willingness to exercise repression to prevent any accountability. With elections set for 2023, we can either expect to see further violence escalation or an indefinite postponement of elections altogether.


A similar pattern emerges from Angola, with violence against citizens increasing again in the aftermath of the 2017 elections that saw Lourenco come to power through a rigged election. Unlike Magufuli’s CCM, though, the MPLA chose a winning figure of nearer to 60% than 80%.


For all one might say about the Trumpian episode in US politics and its dangerous flirtation with autocracy, the fact is that the vote matters in the US and Trump is out (or at least probably will be with Republicans now also losing patience with his intransigence). Americans have exercised their voice. Moreover, no matter whether one resonates with Kamala Harris’s political views, it is a significant feat that an African-American woman has ascended to the White House (and the first woman vice-president in US history) despite so much underlying racial tension in the country.

It is easy to be despondent about the deep structural divides that threaten to disrupt the US democratic equilibrium, but the fact that it has stood firm should encourage us to war against the proliferating autocratic threats to democracy in many African countries. Of course, the continent is not without hope, and the general trend is arguably positive. But it would be amiss of us to ignore the warning signs in Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, not to mention Ethiopia (in which the risk of a full-blown civil war escalates daily), the DRC, Nigeria and Mozambique. Mozambique, in the context of poor governance, deep local grievances and a poverty trap, is fertile soil for the rise of violent extremism. It’s an explosive cocktail that risks spilling over into neighbouring countries.


One recent light in these otherwise dark trajectories, though, is Malawi. Small and poor, for sure, the country is wracked by a history of corruption and extensive poverty. Nonetheless, when Lazarus Chakwera came to power earlier in 2020, in the midst of a global Covid-19 pandemic, he showed that it is possible for the judiciary to stand firm against an incumbent executive bent on staying in power and for the people to vote that president out in an election re-run. This should be celebrated loudly, if cautiously, and remind us that it all starts with governance.

As Dr Grieve Chelwa has quipped, SCOTUS might do well to cite the Malawian court case should Trump successfully get to the Supreme Court over his allegation that the US election results were rigged. We should never give up in our quest to build governance institutions that prevent the abuse of power and give the people a voice.


Dr Ross Harvey is Director of Research & Programmes at GGA. Ross is a natural resource economist and policy analyst, and he has been dealing with governance issues in various forms across this sector since 2007. He has a PhD in economics from the University of Cape Town, and his thesis research focused on the political economy of oil and institutional development in Angola and Nigeria.

Do citizen protests matter?

A sustained combination of internal and external pressure is required to create a genuine civilian government in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwean novelist Tsitsi Dangarembga (C) and colleague Julie Barnes hold placards as they are arrested during an anti-corruption protest march on July 31, 2020 in Harare. Police were enforcing a ban on protests coinciding with the anniversary of President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s election.  PHOTO: ZINYANGE AUNTONY/AFP

Ahead of planned mass protests on July 31, Zimbabwe’s state security apparatus cracked down on citizens. Largely initiated via social media, the calls for the protests galvanised popular sentiment and mobilised citizens to exercise a co-ordinated political voice against corruption, the failing economy and repression.

The regime responded by sending a strong signal to would-be dissenters. In a startling resemblance to events unfolding in Belarus, it arrested journalists and detained, abducted and tortured opposition members, or indeed anyone appearing to question the state.

For consistently exposing government malfeasance and corruption, veteran journalist Hopewell Chin’ono was abducted from his home on July 20. In particular, Chin’ono had revealed Covid-19 related corruption to the tune of $60m.

He is being unlawfully detained at the Chikurubi Maximum Security Prison. Arrested on the same day was Jacob Ngarivhume, who had been spearheading the calls for a July 31 protest.

Both were spuriously charged under the auspices of inciting citizens to participate in public violence. Chin’ono’s lawyer, Beatrice Mtetwa, was then accused of treating the court with contempt because of comments on a Facebook page associated with her.

She has since been barred from defending Chin’ono in a mockery of the rule of law.
In addition to these arrogations of justice, the military junta imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew (ostensibly to slow the spread of Covid-19) and openly beat citizens and opposition members.

Five senior members of the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-A) and its two vice-presidents have recently appeared in court, along with other activists. The Zimbabwean judiciary has been co-opted by Zanu-PF, and opposition groups and many civil society organisations have been infiltrated by the regime.

Zimbabwean journalist and documentary filmmaker Hopewell Chin’ono (R) watches while police search of his offices in Harare on July 21, 2020,  a day after he was arrested and charged with incitement to commit public violence. PHOTO: JEKESAIi NJIKIZANA / AFP

The government then attacked a judicious pastoral letter by the Catholic Bishops Conference, stating that the letter’s “evil message reeks with all the vices that have perennially hobbled the progress of Africa”.

It accuses the archbishop of “fanning the psychosis of tribal victimisation”, dismissing the Gukurahundi massacre of the early 1980s as a mere “dark spot”. It is far worse than that, with upwards of 20,000 people recklessly murdered while the very perpetrators hold positions of power today.Despite this narrowing of the democratic space in Zimbabwe over recent months, largely behind the smokescreen of Covid-19, the Southern African Development Community has failed to condemn the behaviour of the regime.

Bilaterally, SA eventually responded by sending the first of what will likely be a number of diplomatic envoys to Zimbabwe. SA is at least now shedding the hollow excuse of non-interference in the affairs of a sovereign state that tends to animate foreign policy.

Through premeditated violence, the July 31 mass protests were scuppered before they started. Hopes of a southern Arab Spring were dashed. Does this suggest that public protest is not worth it, especially given that the Arab Spring largely turned to a prolonged winter of discontent?

No. Were it not for the planned uprising, the world would have continued to turn a blind eye. Some serious focus is now directed towards Zimbabwe, particularly through the #ZimbabweanLivesMatter campaign.

This is a necessary — if insufficient — condition for change, given the state’s denial of the crisis and its culpability in human rights violations.
A sustained combination of internal and external pressure is now required to convince the military to relinquish power and create the space for a genuine civilian government to be formed.

Internally, the probability of a credible coup attempt seems low. The 2017 coup that ended Robert Mugabe’s 37-year rule is historically anomalous. Constantino Chiwenga (the vice-president) appears unlikely to upend President Emmerson Mnangagwa, despite apparent tensions between them.
Had credible internal support for a coup existed, it is difficult to see why Chiwenga wouldn’t have launched one already.

When Mnangagwa retired four generals loyal to Chiwenga in early 2019, that would, presumably, have been the opportunity. Either way, the internal dynamics of the governing coalition (and state-military relations) are not stable and could potentially be exploited to effect change.

South Africa president Cyril Ramaphosa with his Zimbabwean counterpart, Emmerson Mnangagwa. PHOTO: GCIS

The probability of free and fair elections being held any time soon is close to zero. The last elections (2018) were a charade and resulted in a predictable unleashing of violence against citizens. Economically, the situation is dire, with 90% of the population out of formal employment and inflation above 700%.

As a result, citizen appetite for revolt appears ripe. While the regime’s calculus is that repression is less costly than reform, an active citizenry can nonetheless win out.

Externally, global powers presumably have a direct self-interest in ensuring regional stability and need to step up to the plate.

But the US and the UK face intense pressures on the home front that they are struggling to address. And China and Russia hardly epitomise respect for human rights. Their respective leaders have shattered internal power-sharing mechanisms and are hardly likely to condemn Zimbabwe for pursuing autocratic consolidation.

SA — its political leaders and its businesses with interests in Zimbabwe (such as Anglo Platinum, Implats, Old Mutual and Pick n Pay) — will therefore have to intensify efforts to intervene fruitfully in Zimbabwe. A serious second envoy, including President Cyril Ramaphosa himself, is surely the next step.

Below is a World Economic Forum video on the role of civil society in shaping a future where people matter.


This article first appeared in the South African newspaper Business Day here.


Dr Ross Harvey is Director of Research & Programmes at GGA. Ross is a natural resource economist and policy analyst, and he has been dealing with governance issues in various forms across this sector since 2007. He has a PhD in economics from the University of Cape Town, and his thesis research focused on the political economy of oil and institutional development in Angola and Nigeria.

Zimbabwe: A failed state and a citizenry desperate for change

The army in Harare during military crackdowns, 1 August 2018 PHOTO: Graeme Williams

Eleven days from now, if all goes as planned, mass demonstrations against Zimbabwe’s brutal military dictatorship will be held across the country. We have no reason to expect that the regime will respond to these expressions of frustration peacefully. In character, we should expect that they will use Covid-19 as a smokescreen behind which to shut down the space for civil protest.

It is for this reason, and the fact that the vast majority of Zimbabwean citizens are now living in dire conditions, that Good Governance Africa is launching a campaign in support of reform. Where there is suffering, it is critical that we add our substantive voice to effect change.

Through research precision, with governance passion, GGA exists to improve governance performance across the continent because this results in desirable economic, social and environmental outcomes. The lack thereof, combined with the decimation of the rule of law, violent suppression of the citizenry and the wanton abuse of power on every level, obliterates hope.

Zimbabwe, because of the enduring absence of good governance, is clearly on the edge of chaos. Having been a fragile “limited access order” for at least the past two decades, the 2017 military coup to oust long-term dictator Robert Mugabe held a sliver of (evidently misplaced) hope. This hope did not materialise, and the militarised faction of the ruling Zanu-PF, in an effort to displace the ascending coalition run by Grace Mugabe, has simply run the country into the ground.

Through severe economic mismanagement, unemployment has escalated to 90%, which effectively means that 90% of citizens are reliant on the informal sector. At the behest of the ruling elite, the state apparatus has been repeatedly deployed to destroy the sector, not only physically but also through suspending money market transactions – the only thing enabling poverty-stricken Zimbabweans to trade and eke out a living. It is unconscionable that this military regime openly drives its citizens into destitution.

In limited access orders, political and business elites form a coalition to manipulate economic institutions to generate rents for themselves and distribute them (patronage) to maintain power. Reform is less costly in their political calculus than suppression. Therefore, they ensure that no institutions develop that can provide certainty that economic transactions will be honoured. In other words, they shut down any mechanisms of credibility that signal to investors that their investments would not be expropriated. Moreover, as in the recent episode in Zimbabwe, they shut down any private enterprise such as the stock exchange and mobile money transactions. Ruling party insiders then typically benefit from buying US dollars at the official rate and selling them on the black market for an extortive return. All the while, they blame hyperinflation (now above 800%) on invisible enemies who are “manipulating” the market (and so must be shut down).

Similarly, ruling coalitions of this nature actively undermine the rule of law. Equilibria of coordination that would ensure a broad-based distribution of resources and conditions under which economic dynamism and political accountability could be unleashed are carefully dismantled. They ruthlessly shut down the space for opposition movements or actively drive wedges between them through fear, manipulation or co-optation. It’s a play straight out of the dictator’s handbook.

Setting Zimbabwe on a new trajectory requires the generation of incentives either for the ruling elite to reform, which seems unlikely given the deterioration since 2017 (accompanied by a set of stolen elections), or to step down, which requires immense internal and external pressure.

In support of helping to generate the latter, in the build-up to 31 July, Good Governance Africa will be providing back-to-back content to bring you up to speed, not only with what is unfolding in Zimbabwe, but – more importantly – with unique structural analyses that help you to understand how the current conditions materialised and what can reasonably be done to prevent further malaise and even achieve reform.

From a clear, coherent, consistent and courageous standpoint, GGA stands with the people of Zimbabwe, amplifying their cry for a sustainable resolution to bad governance. This work will also land directly in the hands of those in our networks who hold influential global policy-making positions.

The first material of substance in this respect is the editorial of a special Zimbabwean edition of Africa in Fact (AiF), GGA’s signature publication that was published in May 2019. Dr Sholto Cross writes the following:

“Constitutionalism in Zimbabwe has failed. … This special edition of Africa in Fact considers the ways in which the lack of respect for the 2013 Constitution lies at the heart of the breakdown of public services, the abandonment of the rule of law and the ensuing drastic decline in the quality of life for the mass of the people.”

Indeed, this much is clear. The 2017 military coup that removed Robert Mugabe did little to transform the very party that had done his bidding for 37 years. While it was remarkable that Zanu-PF military loyalists did remove him – entrenched dictators normally die of “natural” causes or are assassinated by forces external to the ruling coalition – the predatory nature of the state he had led has only solidified. One wonders what is left to loot, though.

Every day from here on, one article from this special edition will be released, interspersed with deeper analyses from our team of researchers. We also invite you to follow our AiF blog campaign on Covid-19, where Owen Gagare is providing hard-hitting coverage of the regime’s woeful responses to this epidemic. Your feedback, as always, is welcome. Finally, we ask you to stand with us as we stand with the people of Zimbabwe to effect change.


Dr Ross Harvey is Director of Research & Programmes at GGA. Ross is a natural resource economist and policy analyst, and he has been dealing with governance issues in various forms across this sector since 2007. He has a PhD in economics from the University of Cape Town, and his thesis research focused on the political economy of oil and institutional development in Angola and Nigeria.

How COVID-19 is putting the rule of law to the test across Africa

The second theme of the series explores vulnerabilities to “the rule of law”. One of the key animating features of robust democracy is the rule of law, yet it is one of the most difficult to establish. It exists when no one is above the law; the law is upheld independently of who happens to be in power. From Kenya to Cameroon to Ethiopia to South Africa to Zimbabwe to Nigeria, the robustness of the rule of law is being put to the test.

In Kenya, elites appear to disregard the very rules they espouse for citizens, such as prohibiting public gatherings. In South Africa, the tragic death of Collins Khosa at the hands of National Defence Force members has raised questions about excessive state force. Journalists in Nigeria face heat for criticising political leaders.

Judging by these and other examples, a pervasive feature of responses to COVID-19 appears to be that one set of rules applies to the elites, and another to the citizenry. This arbitrariness undermines legitimacy. But the fact that it is being exposed by the media and called out by citizens is a sign that Leviathan is being tamed.

The concept of the rule of law, despite its broad appeal, still lacks a strong theoretical framework for explaining how it arises. Leading scholars Gillian Hadfield and Barry Weingast wrote in 2014 that simply equating the concept with “stable government capable of enforcing the rules generated by a political authority” is inadequate. Incentives for widespread adherence are what matter.

Outside the handful of stable democratic orders, some of which are backsliding, efforts to build the rule of law have been a bit hit-and-miss. We still do not well understand how legal order is produced and sustained. But we do know that it requires the transition from one coordination equilibrium, where the elites make the rules, to another, where the elites are bound by the same rules as everyone else.

So, what helps to establish the rule of law? What motivates adherence to it?

Among the first steps is that the ruling elite has to accept and abide by a set of rules among itself. They do so because those rules help to generate more rents – returns that exceed those that would have materialised from investment in a competitive market – and therefore stabilise their hold on political power.

Citizens, in turn, become more likely to adhere to the rule of law if they see the ruling elite doing so. Moreover, the rules themselves have to be congruent with prevailing norms, beliefs and values in order to gain traction. There are no guarantees, though, as the elite can also use rents to co-opt and repress citizens.

Most countries’ current coordination equilibria – the elite bargains that determine how rents are generated and distributed – are better characterised as a “limited access order” than an “open access order”, as the late American economist Douglass North conceived them. In the latter, the rule of law applies equally to elites and non-elites, and the rules are upheld independent of who is in power. Sweden is a useful example, as the political equilibrium prevents undermining the rule of law. Access to political and economic opportunity is broad based.

North’s work suggests that analysing most countries through the lens of democracy or non-democracy is inadequate.

I argued in my PhD thesis that we might do better to understand most African countries as some type of limited access order with a large degree of heterogeneity in the coordination equilibria that determine who gets what, when and how. To understand political economy realities, it is critical to understand the internal dynamics of the ruling elite.

In Nigeria, for instance, Olusegun Obasanjo’s 2006 attempts to remove presidential term limits in the constitution were defeated, not so much because the ruling elites were suddenly reformed democrats, but because they saw the constitution as a useful mechanism through which to end Obasanjo’s power-accumulation strategy.

The appeal to the constitution inadvertently served as a precursor to a more open political order in Nigeria. Clearly, given the threat to journalists mentioned earlier, it remains a stretch to argue that the country is epitomised by the rule of law, but it is closer to that end than it was in 2006. Its coordination equilibrium is now more open, which creates greater opportunities for the rule of law to arise.

More recently, Malawi’s historic election offers hope too. The Constitutional Court struck down the results of the questionable May 2019 elections and ordered a rerun.

The rerun was held in late June 2020 and the opposition won. The incumbent president, Peter Mutharika, to his credit, stepped down when the results were announced. Lazarus Chakwera now assumes power.

Craig Moffat, head of the Governance Delivery and Impact programme at Good Governance Africa, explains that a major positive long-term effect will bE the embedding of the idea that it is possible to trust the judiciary to be professional and independent.

The judiciary’s ability to hold the executive to account is one of the most crucial elements of establishing the rule of law. While COVID-19 has accelerated global trends of nationalism and democratic backsliding, Malawi has potentially lit the way for the rule of law to take root in an African context. Its historic example can only have positive regional spillover effects.

Dr Ross Harvey is head of Research and Programmes at GGA.

World Environment Day

Today is World Environment Day. For a brief moment in time, the world may take some time to reflect on the way in which the ecological systems that sustain us are under threat. Perhaps an inadvertent blessing of Covid-19, too, is that it has exposed deep fragilities in our global systems. Our economic systems, first and foremost, clearly require deep reform. Failing to properly account for ecological degradation has unleashed climate change and viral dark matter, both of which have exacerbated vulnerabilities among the worst off. Ecological economists have been raising the red flag on this front for decades.

As we know, human beings are at risk of overstepping several planetary boundaries. These boundaries indicate the limits of what the planet can absorb in terms of anthropogenic impacts. They also interact in sensitive ways, generating risks that overstepping any one boundary may have domino effects on the others, precipitating ecological collapse. Because of these anthropogenic impacts, we are now living through the sixth extinction, compounded by climate change. Radical biodiversity preservation is now a non-negotiable global imperative that will require extensive collective action.

Realising this collective action, however, requires an acknowledgement that humanity has created this diverse set of “wicked’ problems by treating the natural environment as if it is a free good in our economic models. In other words, ignoring the basic laws of thermodynamics has resulted in economic policies that pursue growth in production and consumption without recognising that there are limits to how much growth the planet can handle. It is therefore imperative that we transform our economic models to recognise that no economy is even possible without sustainable ecological foundations.

If Covid-19 is not a catalyst for designing and implementing new economic models that help us to arrive at a more safe and just space in our delicate web of planetary boundaries, it is hard to imagine what could be. Our next edition of Africa in Factto be published on 1 July, deals with this very issue and we encourage you to keep an eye out for it!

Dr Ross Harvey is a natural resource economist and policy analyst, and he has been dealing with governance issues in various forms across this sector since 2007. He has a PhD in economics from the University of Cape Town, and his thesis research focused on the political economy of oil and institutional development in Angola and Nigeria.